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The paper introduces a reform trajectory we call ‘revolutionary incrementalism’ in which partial 
and incremental measures add up to profound transformation.  
Recent advances in economic theory demonstrate that growth is not hard to start: it almost starts 
itself, somewhere, sometimes. But keeping it going is not easy: doing so requires attention to the 
context of growth-binding constraints and situation-specific ways to resolve them. The same 
goes for institutions: it is almost always possible to find some that are working. The issue is 
using the ones that work to improve those that don’t. The thrust of the proposal is to rely on 
variation within existing institutions as the ‘Archimedean lever’ with which to leverage reform 
and change. India’s public sector record for implementing and coordinating innovation efforts 
can be notoriously fragmented and inefficient but there are some parts that perform better than 
others, and there are recognized pockets of excellence virtually within every ministry or public 
sector organization. The same internal diversity is even more visible in the private sector. 
Importantly from a policy perspective, better performing segments of public sector and better 
performing segments of productive sector are beginning to join forces in a variety of search 
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networks—private-public partnerships and programmes to unblock binding constraints and to 
advance reforms. From this perspective, India’s unparalleled heterogeneity is its most beneficial 
aspect. But to leverage internal diversity, the already vibrant search networks have to develop a 
systematic procedure of assessing the constraints and of developing ‘next step’ measures to 
relax them.  
All too often, reform is conceived as a comprehensive blueprint consisting of many desirable 
changes. Neat in theory, but such blueprints tend to become mere ‘wish lists’ in practice 
because of a myriad of implementation constraints. The consensus is that while India needs a 
profound modification of its innovation and higher education system, reforms are blocked 
because of vested interests and significant political economy constraints. Revolutionary 
incrementalism perspective developed in the paper dispenses with blueprints and ‘wish lists’. 
Instead, it proposes a series of strategic pilots, each addressing binding constraints in its own 
way, and a procedure to evaluate these as a way to reform. The proposal draws on lessons from 
China, a recognized paragon of revolutionary incrementalism.  
The paper is addressed primarily to policymakers. It will also be of use to economists with an 
interest in institutional design of innovation policies.  
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1  The jigsaw puzzle of the innovation system 
As is well known, an innovation system consists of a network of organizations, rules, 
and procedures that affects how a country acquires, creates, disseminates, and uses 
knowledge. Key organizations for the creation and diffusion of knowledge include 
universities, public and private research centres, and policy thinktanks. Private firms are 
at the centre of the innovation system. If the private sector has little demand for 
knowledge, the innovation system cannot be effective. Effective R&D-industry linkages 
are vital for transforming knowledge into wealth. Therefore, networking and interaction 
among the different organizations, firms, and individuals are critically  
The main idea behind the concept of an innovation system is one of synergy: an idea of 
the so-called triple helix which conveys a synergy between three major players: 
industry, the government, and universities and research institutes (Figure1). However, 
the reality of all countries which engineered rapid catch-up in the post-war years was 
anything but triple helix. A more accurate characterization is three ivory towers—of the 
government, research creation organizations, and industry—each having little incentive 
to interact with one another. Why has the problem of crossing-boundaries, interaction 
and university-industry linkages proven so difficult everywhere? The following three 
issues are responsible:   
Very long gestation period between research input and actual impact on societal needs 
Figure 1 breaks down this long gestation period from the time of research input to its 
societal impact (as demonstrated by market shares from the perspective of industry and 
improvement of social indicators from the perspective of society) into specific 
components. In biotechnology, for instance, this period is thirty years or more (more  
 
Figure 1 
India’s innovation environment: towards the triple helix 
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than a generation!). But governments, as a rule, do not have such long planning 
horizons: exigencies of electoral cycle, for instance, impose their own logic, which 
makes accountability for the allocation of resources particularly difficult.      
Non-linearity of interaction among major players 
The problem of the long gestation period is compounded by the fact that research 
production function—transformation of inputs (funding of programmes) into research 
impact is not a linear process as the figure suggests. The linear innovation model 
emphasizes technological opportunities, science push, and well-defined stages 
(discovery, invention, innovation, diffusion). The development, production, and 
marketing of new technologies all take place within a well-defined time sequence that 
originates in research activities, then through a product development phase which 
ultimately leads to production and eventual commercialization. It is elegant and neat but 
it is manifestly false.1 In the non-linear model, research (including fundamental) has to 
proceed in constant interaction with industry, with feedback flowing both ways and in a 
way that tolerates the unavoidable failures and uncertainty.   
Political economy problem: management of entrenched interests 
Last but not the least is the fact that changing the incentives of major players to make 
them more amenable to interaction and collaboration in joint projects proved 
notoriously difficult. Harvard University is the richest in the world, with an endowment 
and budget which dwarf the India R&D budget. Yet its rector Larry Summers has been 
forced to resign. The job of rector is to assure an intricate balance between many 
stakeholders: the interests of alumni (who contribute to environment), students 
(concerned about job placement), professors and research (focused in peer-reviewed 
publications), industry (interested in commercialization of research), governments 
(which finance fundamental research) and other stakeholders. A change that is too 
swift—or to be precise, is perceived to be too swift—results in elimination of the driver 
of the change, and this is what happened even with the well-connected Harvard’ rector.2  
This problem of entrenched interests is truly ubiquitous and is central in the 
management of innovation. By all accounts, the Korea innovation system is exemplary. 
The private sector performs 75 per cent of total R&D, which justifies the high 2.8 per 
cent of GNP expenditure on R&D. But a closer look reveals that the country has about 
30 government research institutes which were created in the 1970s with a clear mission 
to conduct public research and promote industry when private sector had not performed 
any R&D. Thirty years later and in a radically different environment, this system of 
government research institutes remains largely unreformed. In the 1990s the 
government established public venture funds as a way to promote venture capital 
industry. Fifteen years later and with a vibrant private venture capital industry, public 
                                                 
1  Agricultural extension is one exception where the linear model seems to be a fairly good 
approximation of reality. In a basic model of agriculture extension, applied research is diffused from 
the source (the agricultural extension unit) to the recipient (agents of the rural economy) and this is 
one reason why agricultural extension proved relatively successful. 
2   There is little doubt that the motives for resignation of the Harvard rector were many, that they were 
complex and that they surely went beyond the entrenched interests we emphasize here. This example 
should be viewed as a parable reminding of the power of a status quo in world-class organizations, 
which are typically very conservative, their excellence non-withstanding. 3 
venture capital industry—an oxymoron—still exists. Duplication and inefficiencies are 
rampant, a fact which shed a new light on the enviably high share of R&D (is this 
because the government is unable to downsize the less efficient segments of public 
R&D?) and even more enviable share of privately executed R&D (is it because 
chaebols prefer to perform all the R&D in-house rather than in collaboration with 
universities and public research institutes?). Far from being a triple helix, the Korea 
innovation system resembles a jigsaw puzzle. Many elements of the jigsaw puzzle 
(public research institutes, vibrant private sector, rapidly growing venture capital 
industry, etc.) already exist. The problem is how to pull the elements together in a 
coherent whole.  
This paper is about a process of how to pull together—gradually and incrementally—the 
jigsaw puzzle that constitutes India’s innovation system from the many pieces that 
already exist. This paper conveys the following three messages about the process. 
First, collaboration between major players is largely about conducive microeconomic 
incentives of such players, not about top-down coordination. The myriad of R&D 
programmes and projects is so clearly inefficient that a well-making policymaker 
attempts to coordinate them in a top-down fashion, by creating inter-ministerial councils 
or a super-ministry of innovation. Good intentions not withstanding, this largely fails. 
Inter-ministerial committees become cartels of established interests while the super-
ministry becomes super-efficient in creating and defending its own turf. The drive for 
top-down coordination is in itself a symptom that something is wrong with incentives of 
agents.  
Top-down coordination used to work in economies with exceptional government 
capabilities such as the Asian tigers, but as the complexity of the economy increases, it 
is failing even there. Korea is a useful benchmark of what a central authority can and 
cannot do in assuring coherence of national innovation system.  
Second, while India needs a profound change in incentives, the actual process of 
changing the incentive structure has to be gradual and step-by-step. ‘We don’t even 
mention the word “reform” until it is underway and cannot be stifled’—this rule of 
thumb from Chile (another useful benchmark for India)—is a must in avoiding the fate 
of hurried reformers, as a parable of Larry Summers suggests.  
Third, incrementalism and pragmatism should not be confused with muddling through. 
We make a sharp dichotomy between ad hoc incrementalism (taking advantage of the 
windows of opportunities in a sporadic way) and strategic incrementalism (gradual 
reform which adds up and results in a dramatic, even revolutionary change). India’s 
innovation system is characterized by tremendous heterogeneity: better-performing 
segments (such as Council of Scientific Industrial Research, CSIR) coexist with poorly 
performing ones. So far, the progress in reform has been possible due to ad  hoc 
incrementalism, a system characterized by the following features: 
–  Gradual but significant introduction of a new incentive structure which not so 
much fights vested interests but accommodates and transforms them by finding 
new roles for potential losers of the reform. Such was the reform of CSIR, 
supported by the Bank’s project in the 1980s. 4 
–  Ability to ‘get around’ the constraints: creativity and ingenuity in tackling many 
unavoidable problems on the path of reform. Constraints are redefined by ‘out of 
the box’ solutions and by forging new alliances. This feature makes a detailed 
blueprint of the end state—the ideal one hopes to achieve—not a particularly 
useful guide for action. In other words, the blueprint for change is useful only to 
the extent that it is changed, adapted, and adopted on a continuous basis.  
–  Reliance on key individual champions which stake their credibility and 
reputation on the outcomes of reform. This creates fragility when the key 
champions change or retire.  
–  Reliance on organizational spinoffs to diffuse and spearhead the reform. For 
instance, New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership Initiative (NMITLI) 
was created as an organizational spinoff as a reformed CSIR, and shares its 
organizational culture of accountability for results, sensitivity to the needs of 
society, and the like.  
Ad hoc incrementalism has been proven to be efficacious in its ability to carry reform 
forward in the difficult Indian environment, but it has serious limitations. The main 
limitation is that the changes and new programmes being introduced in the name of 
reform and enhancement do not necessarily add up: ad hoc incrementalism could 
degenerate into muddling through. As its main recommendation, this paper proposes 
strategic incrementalism, reforming the Indian innovation system with an approach that 
would combine gradual change (which seems the only viable alternative, anyway) with 
a focus on strategic goals of dramatic reform.  
Strategic incrementalism retains all the features of ad hoc incrementalism but relies on 
the following additional three features:  
–  Continuous monitoring of the progress of reform and benchmarking of what is 
feasible: continuous and informed discussion of the ‘next steps’ for reform. An 
informal group should be established to consist of national champions of reform, 
members of the diaspora and international experts to examine further possibilities 
for reform and the steps necessary for achieving them. Consolidation of such 
continuous discussions was arguably the most valuable value added of the 
Bank’s recent innovation project and the most useful contribution of a new 
innovation operation which is under consideration. International benchmarks 
could include countries as diverse as China, Ireland and Chile, all of which have 
made progress in transforming their innovation systems, although each in its own 
way.  
–  Introduction of a diverse portfolio of strategic pilot projects and initiatives, to test 
what is feasible, along with a rigorous evaluation to learn from the pilots. 
National benchmarks should come from carefully monitored pilots, and a system 
which would allow for ranking them. As the ranking, not piloting, is the central 
issue, the selection of pilots should be based on their scalability and diffusion, as 
it is done in China; hence, the name strategic pilots.  
–  Introduction of formal procedures of programme evaluation (to establish 
benchmarks for accountability) and innovation foresight processes (to link 
possibilities from science with the needs of society). This is another dimension 5 
which allows many discrete and gradual actions to be coalesced into a coherent 
innovation system. Institutionalized evaluation provides a feedback from the past 
to present-day decisions, and it introduces accountability for past decisions. A 
process of innovation foresight allows us to map future needs of the society with 
tools and opportunities presented by science. It is a feedback loop from the future 
to inform present-day decisions.  
The logic of our argument is as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by describing the 
uniqueness of India’s innovation system. Since there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, 
understanding the sources and implication of this uniqueness is a starting point of any 
discussion of whatever strategic changes are required. To it put another way; uniqueness 
becomes a major asset to be leveraged rather than yet another vexing complication of 
the jigsaw puzzle. Section 3 is a snapshot of the successful episodes of reform of India’s 
innovation system introduced through incremental changes. Section 4 discusses how 
incremental reforms transformed China’s innovation system, and offers lessons for 
India. Section 5 provides detailed suggestions of the measures needed to transform the 
current ad hoc incremental reforms into strategic incrementalism. The concluding 
section 6 distils the main principles of the policymaking art of combining ambitious 
reform objectives with gradual step-by-step means of its implementation. 
2  Starting point for reform: leveraging the uniqueness of India’s innovation 
system  
The uniqueness of India’s innovation system stems from a combination of at least four 
features. 
2.1  Heterogeneity of the economy 
The first is the unusually large heterogeneity of the economy: the co-existence of high-
productivity and state-of-the-art segments and low-productivity informal sector. 
Because of this heterogeneity, the Indian economy cannot be accurately compared to 
any single economy (even to an economy as large and diverse as the US economy) but 
rather to the world economy as a whole. There are only two other economies in the 
world that are considered world-economies in microcosm—the former USSR and 
China. The USSR broke up because of its inability to manage this heterogeneity while 
China is an exemplary case of huge heterogeneity being leveraged into spectacular 
growth. Both cases are telling benchmarks for India.  
By heterogeneity we mean not just high-productivity modern sectors, such as 
knowledge process outsourcing, co-existing with low-productivity informal sectors but 
heterogeneity running through each sector and indeed through each sphere and walk of 
life. An example is the garments industry. Much of it is conducted in informal shops, 
yet in the state of Tamil Nadu there are also modern factories that are on the cutting 
edge of design and manufacturing. In fact, thanks to a global advantage in warehousing, 
logistics management, and just-in-time delivery, they have become competitive globally 
and have been integrated forward by buying garment designers from Italy. In this case, 
knowledge not only flows from OECD economies to India but also vice versa (Tewari 
2003). In spite of the fact that India has pioneered such a forward integration in the 6 
developing world, it remains an exception within the country and relatively unknown. 
Access to knowledge is as much about access to national best-practices as it is about 
access to best-practices on the international scene. 
The creation of diversity in performance is a key function of the market. Yet the market 
also levels out the differential through labour and factor markets. A defining feature of 
India’s particularly large heterogeneity (as is the case of China and former USSR) is the 
existence of many internal barriers to level out the differentials. Internal migration is the 
most widespread instrument of transfer of national best practices: people migrate to 
expanding regions, and transfer in this way their knowledge from an environment of 
low productivity to one of high productivity. Yet Clark and Wolcott (2003) find that 
migration rates among Indian  states are surprisingly small because of tradition, 
underdeveloped housing markets, and other problems. As a consequence, knowledge 
poles such as Mumbai and Bangalore are underperforming because pervasive 
infrastructure and housing bottlenecks severely impede their capacity to grow. 
Flexibility of the US economy and of its innovation system is assisted by two important 
shock absorbers. On the low end, there is a reserve army of cheap, low-productivity 
labour from Mexico and the rest of Latin America that exerts downward pressure on 
wages for unskilled labour. On the higher end, there is an even larger reserve of global 
talent, not the least from India and China, to higher productivity jobs. The reality of 
India is such that both of these ‘reserve armies’ exist within the country itself, making a 
truly unique microcosm of the world economy. For its neighbouring states, Bihar in 
India is precisely what Mexico and Central America are for the USA, while India’s 
highly successful talent abroad (along with the talent which is yet to leave India) is a 
potential to be tapped for domestic innovation. The jigsaw puzzle of India’s innovation 
system is about leveraging (partly through the lessons learnt from China) its 
heterogeneity and untapped potential.  
2.2  India’s high-productivity segments 
The second characteristic that makes India’s innovation system unique is the 
unsustainability of the peculiar way in which the country has been creating its high-
productivity segments such as the Indian institutes of technology (IITs) (Box 1) and 
Indian Institute of Science (IISc) (Box 2). The high-productivity segments were 
deliberately created as institutional enclaves, with rules and procedures separate from 
the rest of the economy (highly competitive examinations, meritocratic promotion). IIT 
could be characterized more accurately as an exclave—a home-grown extension of 
global knowledge economy, as it bears more similarities with global knowledge leaders 
like MIT rather than the typical, underfunded and understaffed public college in India. 
This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that India’s diaspora of talent is emerging in 
no small numbers among those who failed to be admitted into IIT and had to accept 
enrolment in a western university as consolation. 
The creation of institutional enclaves—islands of excellence amid the sea of entrenched 
interests that defend inefficiency—is a common strategy. The emerging global 
education leaders such as the Monterrey Institute of Technology (see below for more 
details), Korean KAIST and POSCO universities are examples of this strategy. The 
crucial issue is whether society can tolerate such an emphasis on elite organizations and 
for how long these elite organizations can remain insulated from the pressures common 7 
to the rest of the system. There is an indication (as demonstrated, for instance, by the 
recent attempt to increase a mandatory quota of admittance for scheduled castes) for the 
elite organizations of having to open up, and becoming more transparent and 
accountable. This could mean that they would lose their elite status and stellar 
performance. But the whole innovation strategy of India, its global success so far, has 
been based on the ability of the elite organizations to produce high-productivity output 
(mainly graduates) in large numbers, quantities that are not matched by any other 
developing or transition economy. There is considerable tension which calls for elite 
organizations to cater to mass markets that are elite and mass market at the same time—
an organizational hybrid which is yet to be discovered. One of the strategic pilots 
suggested in section 6.4 proposes such a pilot spinoff of IIT to introduce low-costs high-
quality higher education.  
 
Box 1 
Indian institutes of technology (IITs) 
IITs are the elite of technical education in India. They command an unprecedented reputation for 
excellence in technical education globally. The origin of IITs goes back 60 years, to pre-
independence India, when the British government set up a committee to plan higher technical 
institutions in India, which were conceived along the lines of MIT in the United States, training 
not only undergraduates but research scientists and technical teachers as well. Five of the IITs 
were set up in the 1950s and early 1960s and the sixth in the northeastern part of the country in 
1995, and the seventh in 2001, by converting India’s oldest-engineering college to an IIT.  
With aggregate faculty strength of around 2,400 in the seven IITs, the teacher-student ratio is 
around 1:10. The brand equity of IITs is due to the excellence of their undergraduate education 
programme arising out of the selection of the best brains of India through one of the most 
rigorous testing systems in the world. A mere 2 per cent of India’s elite school graduates get into 
the IITs. The same is not true of the postgraduate programmes, as a large number of PhD 
candidates drop out midway and a very small percentage of the undergraduate IITians seek to 
pursue postgraduate studies at the IITs. Presently, around 30 per cent (down from 50 per cent a 
decade ago) of the undergraduates migrate abroad after successful completion of their studies. 
The IITs have been increasing their research focus recently. All the IITs have also established 
industrial research and consultancy offices (albeit with differing names) to promote, facilitate and 
manage institute-industry interaction activities through the usual mechanisms and 
instrumentalities. Four of the IITs have also established campus-based ‘incubators’. Amongst 
the academia, IITs in India have the best interaction with industry largely due to the organic 
linkages to its alumni who command leadership positions in the industry. ITT Bombay is a good 
example. In 1999 it established an incubator to promote technology transfer to new ventures by 
IIT students and faculty. Initially, the funding came from the alumni. Later, with funding provided 
by the department of science and technology and ministry of information and communication, IIT 
Bombay set up an autonomous society SINE (Society for Innovation & Entrepreneurship) to 
manage the incubator programme. Besides providing office space and technical guidance, 
facilities and infrastructure of the IIT, the programme offers supports through grant/loan/equity 
ventures. IIT Bombay houses 15 incubators. 




Indian Institute of Science (IISc) 
The IISc enjoys a prestigious pedigree. Started nearly a century ago, in 1909, through the 
pioneering vision of India’s industrialist J. N. Tata, it has grown into a premier institution of 
research and advanced instruction. The institute is neither a national laboratory like the CSIR 
research institutes, which concentrate solely on research and applied work; nor is it a conventional 
university that mainly concerns itself with undergraduate teaching such as the IITs and most other 
universities. Instead, the institute focuses on research in frontier areas and education in current 
technologically important fields at the postgraduate and doctorate levels. Total postgraduate and 
PhD students number around 2,000 with faculty strength of around 450. Over the years, the 
institute has pioneered in many fields of educational programmes such as aerospace, 
communications, electronics, automation, biochemistry, biophysics, materials science and solid 
state & structural chemistry, space sciences and technology, environmental and atmospheric 
sciences, genetic engineering, etc. Its faculty and alumni have been a reservoir of high-class talent 
from which leaders for the national R&D and the industrial R&D systems are drawn. Now with 
Bangalore developing as a global R&D hub, its manpower is highly valued and in great demand by 
the multinational corporations (MNCs) as well. 
The Union Finance Minister in his 2005 budget speech announced a special budget allocation of 
RS 100 crore as a grant to help make the IIS a university that would rank alongside Oxford and 
Cambridge or Harvard. 
The overall annual budget of the institution is around Rs 225 crore of which around 50 per cent is 
met through government budgetary support; the rest is generated through various externally 
funded projects and schemes. The institute’s Center for Scientific & Industrial Consultancy and 
Society for Innovation and Development provide the interface and interaction with external 
customers and collaborators. It allows and helps staff and students to establish ‘start-ups’ through 
flexible incubation facilities. The institute has also established an S&T park where it has been able 
to attract several well-known Indian and international companies to organize joint research centres 
and undertake collaborative projects. As a result, the institute boasts of some of the best R&D 
facilities in the India and has developed tenable linkages with its customers. In short, the success 
of IISc as the power house of innovation and scientific excellence in a difficult Indian milieu, is 
testimony to its persistent and consistent adherence to excellence arising out of the autonomy it 
enjoys in academic, human and financial matters which is lacking in state run and/or assisted 
universities.  
Source: Bhojwani (2006). 
 
2.3  India, the largest democracy in the world 
The third feature, and one which occupies the limelight of discussions, is of course that 
India is the biggest democracy in the world. More to the point, it is the biggest 
democracy characterized by an inefficient public sector.3 This particular combination 
makes collective action extremely difficult: the more stakeholders are involved, the 
slower the pace of reform. Since stakeholders involved in innovation reforms are 
particularly numerous and diverse (recall our Larry Summers parable for a gist of 
                                                 
3   See World Bank (2006) on problems and solutions on India public service delivery. 9 
diversity), the relevant reforms move with glacial speed or worse, come to a complete 
standstill.  
If the stakeholders’ interests prove so cumbersome at the national level management 
and if government’s involvement in innovation is questionable because bureaucracy is a 
problem rather than a solution, can we propose a mode of government involvement in 
innovation that takes these two particular features into account? A strategic pilot called 
India Fund (modelled after Foundation Chile) explores mezzo-level (lower than national 
but higher than micro-level) level of coordination of multiple stakeholders’ interests. To 
address the problem of pervasive bureaucracy, it piloted a model of private-public 
partnership where the government puts seed money into a privately-led foundation, but 
then entrusts its share to a private, professional management team with clear 
performance criteria.  
2.4  Challenges unique to India 
The final factor of India’s innovation system is that it must face major challenges that 
are unique to India. How will India meet its transportation needs in 20-30 years from 
now? Can it simply mimic Western-style reliance on cars? How will it meet the 
country’s energy needs in the same timeframe? Clean energy technologies will have to 
dominate the energy system, but how to develop such technologies? How to accelerate 
India’s transition to high-value added agriculture (with all the necessary technologies 
such as weather forecasting available to farmers on just-in-time and continuous basis)? 
These are just some of the issues on which India’s innovation efforts have to focus. In 
each of these examples (transportation, clean energy, value-added agriculture), India 
needs to develop its own technological solutions drawing, naturally, on the global 
cutting-edge in science and technology. For a lack of a better term, this agenda can be 
called ‘appropriate technology agenda of the global economy’ with obvious similarities 
with the familiar appropriate technology agenda of import substitution, but also with 
key differences.  
Although many elements of the relevant technological systems exist and many are 
available off the shelf, more need to be developed, and crucially, to be put together in a 
coherent whole. Experience shows that such a complex task of design and 
implementation cannot be accomplished in a top-down fashion (insistence on top-down 
blueprints is one reason why the traditional appropriate technology agenda largely 
failed). The modern view is that Toyota-style design and implementation 
(benchmarking of options and alternative simultaneous designs, etc.) is the only 
practical way to design and implement the complex and open-ended technology systems 
India requires for high and sustainable growth.4  
                                                 
4   One, arguably very controversial idea in this regard, is to explore the creation of an Indian DARPA as 
a scaled-up extension of the NMTLI programme. Indian DARPA, however, is to be private sector led 
in the sense that it will follow a venture philanthropy approach when high-net worth individuals 
(super achievers) transfer managerial experience and personal net worth for resolving major social 
challenges. Indian DARPA should be an institutionalized alliance between the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, super-achievers of India diaspora, the private sector, and the NMTLI programme. The 
key objective of such an alliance is to design mid-level technologies: open-ended technoeconomic 
systems providing functional fit between the unique characteristics of India’s growth and cutting-edge 
technologies available in the world.  10 
Any proposal to reform India’s innovation system should take into account not only the 
uniqueness of the country, but also leverage its unique features. The remainder of the 
paper introduces a reform proposal for leveraging the uniqueness of India’s innovation 
system.  
3  Changing the incentive structure gradually: ad hoc incrementalism  
Successful implement of innovation reform in India has followed an ad  hoc 
incrementalism strategy. For example, the Council of Scientific Industrial Research 
(CSIR) has been restructured from an organization based on autarkic technological 
development for self-reliance to a model based on internationally competitive market 
driven R&D. 
Originally set up in 1942, the CSIR was modelled after the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research in the UK. It predated most other specialized R&D institutes in 
India and had a wide range of functions, ranging from the promotion of scientific 
research to establishing R&D institutions and collecting and disseminating data on 
research and industry. After India’s independence in 1947, the CSIR was set up as an 
independent society under the prime minister. In the first two decades after 
independence it focused on building up an extensive R&D infrastructure from 
metrology to R&D for a wide range of industries, with a strong focus on supporting 
emerging industries, especially small and medium enterprises.  
The global energy shock of the early 1970s coincided with three consecutive years of 
drought in India. In the pursuit of Indian self-reliance, CSIR concentrated on reverse 
engineering products and process technology primarily in pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, glass, and other import-substituting industries; and in adding value to 
technologies, using domestic resources such as high ash coal, small-scale cement plants, 
medicinal and aromatic plants.  
When after the 1991 crisis India shifted from an inward-oriented development strategy 
to a more outward and market-driven economy, the focus of CSIR also changed. With 
the liberalization of trade and industrial policy, firms began to feel more pressure from 
international competition. CSIR was criticized as being unwieldy and not very effective 
at converting scientific results achieved in the laboratories to technology for industrial 
production, and of spending too much effort in ‘reinventing the wheel’ by focusing 
unduly on known processes. The demands of the crisis lead to self-examination and a 
radical change in CSIR’s role from technological self-reliance to ‘R&D’ as its 
operational model, and to a focus responding to the needs of a more competitive market 
with world class industrial R&D. Increased emphasis was placed on output and 
performance, and on issues that were relevant for the income-earning productive 
sectors. Each laboratory was considered a subsidiary corporate entity; incentives and 
rewards for meeting targets were introduced, and laboratories were given operational 
autonomy in relation to how well they delivered on committed output and deliverables. 
In addition, there have been continuous efforts on further streamlining to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
Although CSIR is going through further restructuring, the results to date have been quite 
impressive, highlighting the kind of impact a change in the direction and incentive 
regime of even a very large public research system can have. Between 1997 and 2002, 11 
CSIR reduced number of its laboratories from 40 to 38 and manpower from 24,000 to 
20,000. At the same time there was a noticeable increase in output. Technical and 
scientific publications in internationally recognized journals tracked by the science 
citation index increased from 1,576 in 1995 to 2,900 in 2005; and their average impact 
factor increased from 1.5 to 2.2. Patent filings in India increased from 264 in 1997-98 to 
418 in 2004-05, while patents abroad increased from 94 in 1997-88 to 500 in 2004-55. 
CSIR accounted for around 50-60 per cent of all US patents granted to resident Indian 
inventors. In addition CSIR has increased its earnings from outside income from 1.8 
billion rupees in 1995-96 to 3.1 billion rupees in 2005-06 (about US$65 million) from 
this contract work. Today it has 4,700 active scientists and technologists in 37 research 
laboratories supported by a scientific and technical personnel of 8,500. Its government 
grant budget has roughly doubled between 1997 and today, to 15 billion rupees (about 
US$325 million), so its earnings account for about 20 per cent of its grant budget (based 
on Bhojwani 2006).  
Importantly, New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership Initiative (NMITLI) was 
launched in 2001 by CSIR as its organizational spinoff. It was to catalyze innovation- 
 
Box 3 
Inter-organizational collaboration: examples of successful NMITLI projects 
Over the last five years, NMITLI has supported 42 projects involving over 65 industry partners and 
222 R&D institutions in India with an estimated outlay of about Rs 300 crore (US$65 million). Some of the 
key successes and highly visible products:  
Successes of NMITLI 
•  Bio-suite: A versatile, portable software suits 
for bioinformatics; a multiple tool for carrying 
out diverse bio analyses. Team India efforts 
of TCS and ten institutional partners 
•  Tuberculosis breakthrough: Reduces 
treatment duration from 6 to 2 months. Team 
India effort involves one industrial and twelve 
institutional partners 
•  Psoriasis: A single plant-based oral herbal 
formulation. Project network involves  
two institutional and one industrial partners 
•  Others: Breakthrough technologies on 
leather, cost-effective simple office 
computing platform (softcomp); monsoon-
related predictions; mesoscale modelling; 
lysostaphin; novel biotherapeutic molecule, 
baggasse 
Source: Bhojwani (2006). 
Examples of NMITLI programmes 
Docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) 
Vital nutrients for babies and aged persons 
•  Reduction in uptake due to food habits 
•  Identified thraustochytrid strain producing high 
amount of DHA 
•  Fermentation process up scaled 
•  Battery of genes identified and transferred in 
yeast 
•  Transfer of genes into sunflower and brassica 
standardized 
•  Novel positive selection markers developed 
•  16 patents portfolio created 
 
Health care: addresses diseases of the poor, 
special Indian needs, unmet medical needs; 
degenerative disorders; life-style diseases; 
leveraging Indian traditional knowledge space 
Towards Indian leadership: tuberculosis, psoriasis, 
lysostaphin, arthritis/diabetes/hepatoprotectives, 
eye&vision, and cancer 
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led development aimed at achieving a global leadership position in a few selected niche 
areas. The programme aims to turn sound technological ideas into a reality through the 
systematic development of innovative projects. 
NMITLI supports R&D commercialization at the ‘proof of concept’ stage, by granting 
financial assistance to institutional partners and soft loans (3 per cent interest) to 
industrial partners. NMITLI has carved out a unique niche in the innovation space in 
India and has developed a favourable ‘brand image’. Projects predominantly have been 
in the broad area of biotechnology (40 per cent) and in drugs and pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals (15 per cent each)—areas in which CSIR has recognized core competence. 
(see Box 3). NMITLI projects, which are totally government-funded, enjoy an average 
of about Rs 7 crore per project, the highest of all government technology development 
programmes. NMITLI projects are carefully monitored and discontinued, if progress is 
unsatisfactory.  
The NMITLI concept should now be scaled up by broadening its scope to extend 
support for pre- and post-NMITLI programmes, including those beyond national 
boundaries. Financing pre- and post-activities would help to generate better technology 
project ideas and accelerate the process of bringing products to market. Opening the 
programme to international collaboration would help leverage the best minds and 
facilities within India and beyond, thus enhancing outcomes and returns. Further, the 
programme should provide grants (currently grants are provided to institutions, but soft 
loans to private firms) to research institutions as well as private enterprises, thus 
providing a level playing field in exchange for a share of royalty revenues from 
successful projects. Further, an independent evaluation should be undertaken by a 
committee that includes members of the international community. Based on such a 
review, appropriate changes in the management as well as monitoring of the programme 
should be introduced. 
Indeed, the reformed CSIR and its organizational spinoffs—such as the NMTLI—
illustrate that incrementalism has proven to be a successful reform approach which 
relies on and leverages the unique features of India’s innovation system. The challenge 
is to combine ad hoc incrementalism (taking sporadic advantage of the windows of 
opportunity) and strategic incrementalism (gradual reform that builds up and culminates 
in a dramatic change).  
4   Undertaking reform by growing: lessons from China  
By 1980, China had developed a massive but largely incoherent R&D-system, with 
4,690 research institutes affiliated to administrative bodies above the ‘county’ level, i.e., 
central, provincial, and regional/city governments, and some additional 3,000 institutes 
at the county level. Personnel consisted of 323,000 scientists and engineers working in 
these institutes. The share of R&D expenditures was more than 1 per cent of GDP, a 
level higher than in any country at a comparable income level.5  
                                                 
5   The first three paragraphs of this section draw on Gu (2006).  13 
The reform programme initiated in 1985 had two prongs. On the one hand, ‘technology 
markets’ were established to align R&D institutes with the needs of industry, while on 
the other hand, operational subsidies from the government were gradually reduced. 
Autonomy in various degrees was introduced to the R&D institutes (in terms of 
personnel, research projects, and acceptance and use of contractual fees). The 
technology market solution, central in the initial design, had largely failed. Both buyers 
and sellers faced difficulties in engaging in market transactions: buyers were unable to 
absorb the transferred technology, while those selling it could not earn enough to secure 
their R&D institutes because the market was too small. 
In response to this drawback, reform policy in 1987 began to promote the merger of 
R&D institutes into existing enterprises or enterprise groups. The merger approach was 
also largely a failure. Huge gaps between the consolidated institutes, ranging from 
differences in work culture to administrative affiliations, were hard to overcome. Yet, 
the drastically reduced R&D subsidies and the resultant budget constrains (recall the 
second prong of 1985 reform) opened the policy space which facilitated a variety of 
spinoffs, first by individuals (scientists and engineers creating a spinoff from the 
‘mother’ institute) and later by organizations. In 1988, the Torch Programme was 
launched to encourage spinoff enterprises—called new technology enterprises 
(NTEs)—from existing R&D institutes and universities.  
NTEs became the institutional vehicle to bring together the most dynamic segments of 
R&D establishment: R&D institutes, universities, S&T staff, and local governments. 
Local governments contributed to invest in the ‘new and high-tech industry zones’ as 
supporting institutions of the NTEs. Scientists and engineers, often in affiliation with 
their parent institutions, focused on the commercial application of their inventions and 
expertise.  
The strategy of concurrently freeing up policy space for new dynamic elements (from 
this perspective, the draconian reduction in subsidies was paramount, as it motivated 
research and experimentation), and introducing explicit measures to encourage the 
diversity of pilots and organizational spinoffs worked well because it was almost ideally 
suited for exploiting the tremendous heterogeneity of the Chinese economy and its 
innovation system.  
Freeing up policy space to existing players through the gradual reduction of subsidies 
provided motivation to search for new solutions and approaches. Explicit measures to 
promote spinoffs served to create and institutionalize search networks of diverse 
individuals and organizations looking for new options. In the case of NTEs, search 
networks brought together federal government officials (who monitored the results of 
the experiment), industry, R&D institutes, and local governments (who contributed the 
critically needed resources such as high-tech industry zones, but who also reaped the 
rewards of high growth).  
The result was ‘double transformation’:6 high growth resulting from self-discovery and 
the diffusion of new segments of economy, and reform of the established structures 
                                                 
6   Note the marked contrast here with Polanyi (1944). His ‘double transformation’ argued for a need to 
create social institutions to correct for the alarming consequences of growth under capitalism. In our 
view, the generalized spinoff dynamics illustrated here with the transformation of China’ innovation 
system has, given adequate monitoring from stakeholders, the capacity to create necessary 14 
supporting them. Another example of such double transformation, taken from another 
end of the heterogeneity spectrum, is the transformation of rural industries and role of 
the SPARK programme in this process (Box 4).  
To illustrate double transformation, we refer to the birth of a ‘new’ information and 
communications industry (ITC), and its economy-wide contribution through the 
application of powerful information and communications technology (Gu 1996; Gu and 
Steinmueller 1996/2000). Table 1 illustrates double transformation.  
To underline the innovative procedure of new organizations emerging as spinoffs of 
entrenched structures, Gu and Steinmueller (1996/2000) conceptualize the dynamics as 
the recombination of capabilities. In our view, however, the process is deeper and more 
profound. Dramatic reform occurs as new incentives are introduced and 
institutionalized. Yet, such dramatic revolutionary reform evolves gradually, step-by-
step. The recombination of capabilities was exhausted in China by the end of the 1990s 
and other more coordinated reform approaches became necessary. Yet, ‘double 
transformation’ continues.  
Double transformation generates a wide range of gradual step-by-step reforms leading 
to extraordinary changes. The cascade of institutional changes began in the 1970s with 
agricultural reform that recognized peasants’ control over the plots they currently 
worked, and permitted farmers to sell any surplus over target levels at market prices and 
for their own account. The result was a sustained increase in agricultural productivity 
and a rise in rural incomes. In the 1980s another wave of reform allowed the proceeds 
 
Table 1  
Double transformation’ of China’s innovation system  
 ICT  industry    Machinery  Textile 
Growth dimension: 
Technological gaps 





     
Means of filling the gaps   Application and sales 
of advanced products  
Technology licensing   Access to global 
knowledge and 
capital goods  
     













Transformation of R&D 
institutes 




Joint ventures  
Small local startups 
Source:   Adopted from Gu (2006). 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions of growth through expansion. On a central similarity between this perspective on 
institutional formation and Toyota-style industrial system, see Sabel (2006). On spinoff dynamics, 
see Ellerman (2005).  15 
 
Box 4 
Harnessing the heterogeneity of China’s rural industry and agricultural research system:  
the SPARK programme  
With the emergence of a rapidly growing and dynamic rural non-state enterprise sector in the early 
1980s, and with the Chinese government's determination to utilize more actively the science and 
technology developed in the country in the real sector, the ministry of science and technology 
initiated the nationwide SPARK programme in 1986. Its overall objective was to help transfer 
technological and managerial knowledge from the more advanced sectors to rural enterprises to 
support continued growth and development in the non-state rural enterprise sector, mostly in the 
TVEs and to help increase output and employment. The programme has now spread to virtually 
every province and has helped develop 66,700 projects and many more individual enterprises 
within these. Some 20 million people have found employment in rural areas. Possibly the greatest 
impact has been the increase in annual per capita income of the rural population in those areas 
where the SPARK programme has been active. In one TVE in Jingyang County in Shaanxi, there 
has been almost a threefold increase in per capita income of the county population over the 
previous five years.  
Under SPARK, courses were conducted for trainees, modern training centres were established with 
modern equipment in computer, video production facilities, language and scientific laboratories. 
The TVE sector demanded training for rural enterprises, and SPARK responded according, using 
appropriate methodologies, such as instructional packages, teaching materials, curriculum, and 
audio/video productions. A computerized technical information system was also set up, with 
thousands of technical databases for rural enterprises. These network systems provide technical, 
economic, marketing, and sales channel information to TVEs. Broadcast-quality videos of ‘SPARK 
science and technology’ programmes were also developed with a specific target to TVEs and 
farmers. The project offered technical evaluation training to staff in national, provincial and local 
SPARK programme offices so as to approach SPARK project evaluation systematically, and to 
equip them with analytical techniques and sources of information in order to be able to offer quality 
help to rural enterprises. Another major objective of the national SPARK programme was the 
diffusion of technical and managerial knowledge from successful projects to non-project 
beneficiaries. 
The most dynamic segments of China’s rural industries are drawn to the SPARK programme to 
increase their productivity and help them expand. SPARK’s most successful projects have become 
pillar industries in their respective ‘SPARK intensive’ areas, leading to vertical and horizontal 
integration of related industries either in their own localities or extended to other provinces. SPARK 
provides a tool for diffusing and scaling-up local success stories. In other words, SPARK is able to 
harness the enormous heterogeneity of China’s rural economy: it not only amplifies the better 
performing segments but links them to the less advanced areas by assembling packages of 
managerial, marketing and technical services.  
The same heterogeneity principle applies to the transformation of China’s agricultural research 
system. SPARK has become a focal point for drawing and leveraging the best and the most 
relevant properties from this massive but not particularly efficient system. In this manner, the 
agricultural research system reorients its staff’s incentives towards research programmes that 
service the needs of rural clients.  
Source: Written on the basis of World Bank (1998); and Huang et al. (2004). 
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of improved agriculture to be invested in town and village enterprises (TVEs), i.e., 
municipality-owned manufacturing firms or those co-owned with private parties, with 
production targeted for both domestic and export markets. Again, proceeds after tax 
obligations were retained by the enterprise and made available to its stakeholders. The 
TVEs continued to expand through the mid 1990s, competing with state-owned firms and 
adding to the modest pressure exerted by the central state for their reform. The TVEs 
unleashed creativity in China’s rural industry, the lower end of the heterogeneity scale. 
Measures to promote search networks to bring together dynamic segments from diverse 
fields were important (Box 4).  
Changes around the middle of the heterogeneity scale were accompanied and accelerated 
by partial reforms of the financial system, the opening of export-processing enclaves to 
foreign firms and joint ventures. At the higher-end of the productivity spectrum, 
reforming the innovation system through recombination resulted in dramatic changes.  
The outcome is a profusion of new institutions that promote investment incentives and 
efficiency-enhancing behaviour in various domains without ever creating what, from a 
consensus view, seems to be the essentials of a capitalist economy: China is privatizing 
state firms very haltingly, has only recently recognized private corporate property as a 
distinct legal category, and makes little pretence of an independent judiciary. 
 
Figure 2 
Elements of strategic incrementalism 
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5  Strategic changes through incremental steps: strategic incrementalism  
Can India learn from China’s experience in harnessing its heterogeneity and creating 
new institutions, promoting growth and undertaking reforms? Building on developments 
in ad hoc incrementalism, we propose the following for India:  
–  institutionalizing search networks of champions: continuous monitoring of the 
progress of reform and benchmarking of what is feasible; 
–  systematically evaluating programmes and projects; 
–  designing and implementing a portfolio of strategic pilots that probe economic 
potentials and establishing benchmarks for action; and 
–  instigating an innovation foresight process as a deliberative evaluation of the 
future.  
Next, we consider each of these components in turn.  
 5.1 Institutionalization of search networks of champions 
Everywhere, including India, change is driven by champions, individuals willing to risk 
their reputation on the results of reform. Such an informal group of leaders of key 
innovation organizations clearly already exists in India. The first priority for this group 
is to conceptualize, in a series of focused discussions on the ‘next steps’, the nature of 
the reform they are collectively promoting. The second priority is to include key 
decisionmakers from the national planning commission, the ministry of finance, and the 
Indian diaspora in these deliberations.  
Reform being designed and implemented incrementally cannot have a clear blueprint. 
Whereas complex problems are solved in traditional hierarchical organizations by 
reducing them to simple tasks, and then aggregating the results of the simplified 
operations, reform of the Indian innovation system relies on solving complex problems 
by seeking out individuals who are already resolving (a part of) them. These systems of 
linking global expertise to local circumstances are called search networks. 
What is required is a credible search network to link the champions from innovative 
communities, key economic decisionmakers and selected members of the diaspora, who 
could serve as antenna for new trends to be reflected in strategic decisions. To illustrate 
our point, we review the example of Taiwan.  
When the Taiwanese government decided to promote venture capital industry in the 
beginning of the 1980s, it had neither the capability, nor the blueprint for doing so. 
There was opposition to the idea because the venture-capital concept was foreign to 
traditional practices, in which family members closely controlled all of the financial 
affairs of a business. Entrenched interests wishing to maintain the status quo were 
strong. Through intense interaction with Taiwanese expatriates in Silicon Valley, new 
institutions provided matching capital contributions to private venture capital funds. 
One example is the Seed Fund, with initial allocation of NT$800 million which later 
was complemented with an additional 1.6 billion. 18 
Two American-style venture funds—H&Q Asia Pacific and Walden International 
Investment Group—were created in the mid-1980s. They were managed by US-
educated overseas Chinese who were invited to reallocate to Taiwan. Once the first 
venture funds proved successful, domestic IT firms created their own venture capital 
funds. After those became profitable, even conservative family groups started to invest 
in venture capital funds and IT businesses.  
The search network initially consisting of key dynamic and forward-looking members 
of the Taiwanese government and leading overseas Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley 
was central to the modern venture capital industry emerging in a very unlikely place that 
had been dominated by conservative and risk-averse business groups. Although this 
network lacked a blueprint, it did have Silicon Valley as a role model, and a clear idea 
of ‘what to do next’. By defining each subsequent step of the process, the network 
expanded, eventually encompassing also the sceptics and opponents as well.  
5.2  Systematic evaluation of programmes  
Evaluation is a management tool, linking the impact of programmes with budget 
allocation decisions. Figure 3 illustrates key concepts of the evaluation of innovation 
programmes: inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact and their respective timeframes.  
Key issues in the design of a national programme evaluation process include concerns 
with respect to cost-effectiveness criteria. It is important that outlined evaluation criteria 
are transparent, objectives clear, and application of the criteria measurable. The cost 
effectiveness of the process must also be factored in when designing an evaluation 
process. Incorporating widespread use of ICT could be a step towards greater cost 
effectiveness.   
Figure 3 
From inputs to impact: long-term time horizon in innovation 
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To avoid potential conflict of interest in implementing a national procedure for 
programme evaluation, the monitoring and evaluation processes should be separate. 
While monitoring and ex post reviews should be carried out by a neutral third party, 
ex ante evaluation can be carried out within the programme itself, to facilitate linking 
the programme’s key financial decisions to evaluation. International projects should be 
evaluated and monitored in the same manner as national projects, bearing in mind 
national benefits, objectives, and demands.  
Optimal would be a 3-5 per cent of the programme budget allocated to evaluation. 
While evaluation ideally should be a management tool, i.e., evaluation results should 
affect decisions relating to budgetary allocations, this can initially be an over-ambitious 
goal. Programmes that, based on evaluation, are likely to be found to be inefficient will 
resist regular review procedures. Again, this is the problem of political economy in 
managing the entrenched interests. To ameliorate the problem, such feedback should be 
made public. The mere fact of public access to impartial evaluation results will provide 
a strong disciplinary element and pressure relevant agents to change established 
procedures and improve performance.     
5.3  Portfolio of strategic pilots and its deliberative evaluation  
Strategic pilots should examine new organizational models, test their feasibility, and in 
this way harness the unique features of India’s innovation system. These pilots are 
strategic because they introduce all the features of the reformed innovation system: 
accountability for results, built-in incentives for collaboration and structures of 
governance for the continuous redesign of the pilots. In that sense, they are elements of 
the desired innovation system.  
The four features of India’s uniqueness (unparalleled heterogeneity of the economy; 
pressure on the elite organizations to open up; unique complexity of the concerted 
action problem, and the need for new solutions to address India’s major challenges) 
were discussed in section 2. Here we examine four pilots to address each of these 
challenges in order to get an idea of how pilots can signal and design new strategic 
solutions.   
Strategic pilot 1:  A new agenda for India’s talented diaspora:  
piloting new organizational solutions  
Diaspora is a part of India. Both share the same culture, history and understanding of 
the unique problems of the country. But it also constitutes a part of the global 
knowledge and hence understands the possibilities knowledge can bring. India’s 
diaspora has been crucial in spurring private sector growth, namely outsourced IT, and 
later outsourced knowledge process. The new challenge now is to make a similar 
contribution in the delivery of public services, particularly in education and health, and 
especially in the less developed states.  
A pilot on new delivery modes of non-communicative (non-infectious) diseases that 
relies on the ideas, projects and contributions of India’s expatriates and which is 
currently being developed by the ministry of non-resident Indians is one example. Why 
would successful Indian doctors, epidemiologists and engineers residing abroad return 
to Bihar, a state considered to be underdeveloped or backward? The answer is that they 20 
do not need to make a permanent comeback, merely periodic visits. More to the point, 
the commitment of talent to organizations abroad usually is not a constraint to diaspora 
contributions. Rather, it is first and foremost the lack of commitment by the local public 
sector and its inability to find space in projects that can be monitored for utilizing the 
energy, knowledge and resources of the expatriates. Once such projects are defined and 
diaspora involved in their implementation, their contribution can be crucial. The second 
constraint is one of logistics and bureaucracy. Many medical professionals, particularly 
retirees, would be willing to engage in projects for a limited time, but are faced with 
problems of finding temporary residence or other logistics. A pilot could alleviate both 
constraints by finding an organizational model to transform the interest of the diaspora 
into specific projects. One such model is the GlobalScot (Box 5).  
GlobalScot operates mainly with private sector talent so the model cannot be duplicated 
in the private sector domain, yet the procedure that enables transforming general interest 
so as to involve diaspora in specific commitments deserves closer examination.  
The Bihar pilot would focus on the lower end of India’s heterogeneity. At a higher end, 
a private early-stage fund could be established in Karnataka with diaspora participation. 
The Taiwan venture capital example mentioned earlier illustrates one general approach 
to an early-stage pilot involving expatriates.      
Box 5 
From a general interest to specific projects: the GlobalScot network 
GlobalScot is a highly innovative and successful network of about 850 high-powered Scots from all 
over the world who use their expertise and influence as antennae, bridges, and springboards to 
generate projects in Scotland. GlobalScot forms a part of the Scottish Enterprise—Scottish 
Economic Development Agency. The search role of diaspora members can be illustrated by the 
following:  
•  An inward investment project identified by one of the first members to join GlobalScot brought 
an internet licensing company to Glasgow. The company, which, initially employed eight people, 
will ‘quickly become a multimillion pound business’, according to the company’s founder. 
•  At a crucial stage of its negotiations with a US blue-chip company, a Scottish electronic 
engineering company received, within a day of its request, a full day’s advice on how to 
negotiate a licensing deal.  
•  A specialist training provider to the international oil and gas industry looking for an entry point 
into the Gulf of Mexico was connected to a GlobalScot member who was the former president of 
Enterprise Oil, Gulf of Mexico. The member introduced the firm to oil and gas companies in the 
region, which led to cooperation with several of the companies and a firm foothold in the market. 
•  A company specializing in creating virtual characters for gaming software made valuable 
connections with a number of GlobalScots during a trip to California for an exhibition. A director 
at the company described the contacts as ‘an absolute bull’s-eye target for the type of business 
advice needed... people you would never dream of trying to reach, as there would usually be 
about a dozen gatekeepers between you’. 
•  A GlobalScot member who is vice-president for production procurement at IBM donated one 
day a month to work with Scottish Enterprise’s electronics team, providing insight into the global 
electronics sector by advising on new product developments, growing and shrinking markets, 
and new opportunities. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 21 
A critical question is how to gauge whether the pilots are succeeding and, if so, how to 
scale and diffuse them. This is a function of the so-called deliberative evaluation: 
information pooling from the pilot’s implementation, and discussions among all 
concerned parties as to what should be the ‘next step’ for the pilots. The Ministry of 
Overseas Indian Affairs can adopt a new role for itself by focusing mainly on the design 
and continuous deliberative evaluation of the pilots. We would, in fact, argue that it 
should be its main role. By mastering and focusing on such a new function, it would be 
providing an important signal for other government agencies.  
Strategic pilot 2: High-quality, mass-market higher education as a spinoff of IITs  
India is not the only country facing a conundrum of elite institutions that need to adapt 
to the changing societal environment.  
The Monterrey Institute of Technology in Mexico is a premier private education 
organization comprising a network of 33 campuses all over the country. It is a franchise 
system of local campuses, each financed and governed by local private sector leaders. 
Its Virtual University is a worldwide leader in remote learning, championing an 
ongoing, continual education agenda all over the Spanish-speaking world and making 
inroads into such giant markets as China. To reach students with limited financial 
resources, the Institute launched a spinoff—TecMilenio (Millennium University)—
designed to combine the high level of teaching associated with the Tec de Monterrey 
brand with education at dramatically lower costs. By May 2004, approximately 10,000 
students were enrolled, with the per student costs approximately three times lower than 
in the parent organization. What are the main factors that allowed this dramatic 
reduction in costs without a compromise in quality? 
The curriculum is designed and often delivered through the management of private 
sector firms. TecMillenium shares offices in some instances with these firms so that 
students and teachers often work, learn and teach in the same location. To tap the best 
professors and courses, distance education is commonly utilized. Pedagogy is based on 
problem-solving and conceptual tests. Yet, testing is standardized and centralized. 
Teaching remuneration is based on student test results. The small management structure 
draws on carefully selected professors from Tec de Monterrey staff and translates the 
needs of industry into pragmatic curricula. Thus the vested interests of professors 
sometime perpetuating decades-old material are curbed: content is determined by the 
needs of the industry. TecMilenio hopes to achieve a student enrolment of 100,000 by 
the year 2010. 
TecMilenio is a spinoff from Tec de Monterrey. Drawing on the strengths of the parent 
university while evading the unavoidable rigidities of established organizations, 
TecMilenio is evolving into a ‘lean and mean just-in-time’ system of low-cost learning, 
quite different from the educational model of its parent institute.   
Based on this example, to introduce low-cost high-quality education, we propose a 
spinoff similar to the IITs.   
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Strategic pilot 3:   Establishing Foundation India as an incubator of search networks 
in order to open new avenues for the economy  
As is well-known, India is a leader in knowledge process outsourcing, which became 
the major development in the decades around the millennium. Public debate is centred 
on what could be ‘the next big thing’ for India: the new avenue of learning to give India 
global recognition. This perspective is compelling, valid, and inspiring, yet is usually 
focused on a single possibility, a major high-tech company such as a future ‘Google of 
India’. Understandable, but such a perspective ignores key possibilities for the future.  
Even within the confines of a high-tech innovation agenda, the ‘next big’ thing could 
also be a cluster of middle-sized companies (some of them expanding into major 
companies), as exemplified by the Israeli biotechnology cluster. Second, and more 
importantly, a mid-tech agenda—distinct from both the export-driven high-tech agenda 
(which seems to dominate the limelight) and the indigenous informal technology agenda 
that focuses on the very poor and their related technology—could over the coming 
decade become the next ‘big thing’ in India. Israel (prior before its innovation takeoff in 
the beginning and mid 1990s), and Taiwan (prior to its venture capital boom in the end 
of the 1990s) are two highly relevant benchmarks for India. In both cases, the 
innovation takeoff relied upon (and would have been unthinkable without) high-tech 
talent abroad. Highly innovative government programmes were established in both 
countries to tap into relevant global management and marketing networks in Silicon 
Valley and other similar places. Such programmes adapted and adopted to the Indian 
reality seem indispensable in the search for the ‘next big thing’ in high-tech innovation 
agenda.  
Although many elements of the relevant new innovation clusters already exist and are 
available off–the-shelf, many more need to be developed, and aligned into a coherent 
whole. Experience shows that the complex task of design and implementation cannot be 
accomplished in a top-down fashion or with top-down coordination. This is an 
important message for India, as proposals to establish a science and technology 
super-ministry embodied with extraordinary powers are still popular. Insistence on top-
down blueprints is one reason why the appropriate traditional technology agenda largely 
failed.  
We propose Foundation India to be established as a hub and springboard of private-
public search networks. Foundation India could be conceived of as a private-public 
entity with an endowment of US$100-300 million, with the autonomy to develop and 
provide (in collaboration with the private sector) seed financing for the purpose of 
generating demonstration effects of how new technology can address mundane but 
pressing issues of everyday life in India (examples include, but are not limited to, clean 
energy technologies, value-added agriculture, appropriate transportation solutions, etc.). 
In order to succeed, Foundation India would need to perform two tasks simultaneously:  
–  Project development: scan the world in search of appropriate technologies, adopt 
these to India’s needs and ultimately develop them into commercially viable 
projects; 
–  Seed capital financing: provision of seed capital to some of the projects as 
demonstration and to trigger to venture capital industry and other sources of 
finance.   23 
 
Box 6 
Project selection in Foundation Chile as an example of deliberative evaluation 
Only in the aftermath of the 1982 economic shock did the Foundation develop the activities that 
define it now. Sharp devaluation, low domestic interest rates and high uncertainty produced a 
situation favourable to domestic investment but with nationals unwilling to invest. Seeing an 
opportunity in salmon farming, the Foundation decided to launch the firms itself, hoping that 
success would lead to imitation and complementary activities. Thus it acquired the necessary 
technology, free, from specialist public agencies in the Pacific northwest of the United States, and 
founded one firm to produce smelts, another to develop the hatching and ranching technology for 
Chilean waters and a third for smoke-curing fish. From these firms evolved the Chilean salmon 
industry, which now produces exports valued at US$600 million annually. 
In the next two decades the Foundation’s model of supporting development was refined in three 
crucial ways. First the Foundation shifted from creating start-ups itself to co-venturing with outside 
partners. Whereas during 1985-93, 87 per cent of the start-ups were totally owned by the 
Foundation itself (and only one of the joint ventures involved a foreign partner), during the period 
1994 to 2004, 75 per cent of the start-ups were joint ventures, and six of these were with foreign 
firms. Thus the Foundation went from spinning out projects developed internally to networking with 
outsiders to create projects. Second, technological complexity of the projects increased, with 
biotechnology in particular becoming more important. Since projects, such as new vaccines, 
development of pest-resistant fruit varieties, often required the integration of scattered intellectual 
property and diverse technical tools for genetic manipulation, many of the external partners had to 
construct networks of their own to serve the specific needs of the emergent companies. Thus the 
Foundation, in effect, builds search networks linking global knowledge with local capabilities.  
Third, the Foundation’s own project  selection and review mechanism became more explicitly 
comparative and competitive. Staff members, hired on the basis of demonstrated technical 
knowledge and familiarity with the markets and business practices in a particular sector, apply for 
internal grants to develop a plan for launching a new venture in some general area. The best of 
these preliminary plans can be used to apply for a second, longer-term grant to develop a new 
business venture, typically in partnership with outsiders; and so on until the proto-venture becomes 
a candidate for seed capital and enters the familiar sequence of venture capital financing. So far, at 
least, the transparency inherent in the broad and continual benchmarking of projects at every stage 
has also functioned as an effective governance mechanism, assuring that public funds are indeed 
directed towards public purposes, as best these can be defined at any moment. 
Source:  Based on Fundación Chile (2005). 
 
One benchmark for the proposed Foundation India is a similar arrangement in Chile. 
The Foundation Chile was created as a nonprofit corporation by the Chilean government 
in 1976 with a US$50 million in payment by conglomerate ITT as part of an indemnity 
agreement for the expropriation of its national telephone subsidiary. Under the terms, 
ITT was to manage the new facility for ten years, but its initial efforts were not 
successful: its first director-general, who was a semi-retired food ITT research scientist, 
steered the new institution towards the provision of social services such as school 
lunches and nutrition for infants. A year later he was replaced by the head of ITT’s 
Spanish telecommunications laboratories, who improved the Foundation’s project-
management skills, but who favoured dedicating the Foundation to telecommunications 24 
projects, for which there was no market, and foodstuffs for which the markets were 
incipient. The related dialogue on the shortcomings of the suggestions, however, drew 
attention to opportunities in renewable resources—principally forestry, aquiculture, 
horticulture—which became the lasting focus of the Foundation (Box 6). 
Strategic Pilot 4: Leveraging venture philanthropy to address India’s challenges  
The so-called venture philanthropy relies on the following principles:  
–  tapping into new sources of finance, such as the wealth of super-achievers;  
–  recognizing that managerial expertise and knowledge, and new organizational 
solutions, rather than money, are the most important contribution to 
development;  
–  support to managerial teams that pilot new solutions: Following the lead of 
venture capitalists, venture philanthropists remain personally involved in these 
managerial teams; 
–  focus on deliberative evaluation: systematic discussion of the elements in new 
approaches that work and those that do not;  
–  focus on leveraging other resources, including those of the government through 
strategic alliances.  
Following the venture philanthropy approach, what we propose is the creation of a 
civilian version of the famous US DARPA as an extension and scale up to the NMTLI 
programme. Indian version of DARPA could be started as an alliance between the Bill 
Gates Foundation, the super-achievers among India’s diaspora, the private sector, and 
NMTLI programme.  
5.4  Innovation foresight process as a deliberative evaluation of the future  
Foresight offers challenging visions of the future and transforms them into effective 
present-day strategies through the provision of core skills in future science-based 
projects and unequalled access to leaders in government, business, and science. The 
process of foresight attempts to identify potential opportunities for the economy or 
society from innovative science and technology, and considers how future technology 
can address society’s key challenges. 
The Technology Information Forecasting and Assessment Council has conducted a 
number of long-term forecasts for India (in auto parts industry, for instance). However, 
the foresight process we propose for India differs from forecasting methods in a number 
of ways. It is participative, with the processes receiving as much emphasis as the 
outcomes because of their need to develop a shared vision across independent agencies. 
It is long term, with perspectives taken as long as 25 years in terms of direction and 
tendencies, although resource plans and implementation elements are usually much 
shorter, typically with three to eight year horizons. It is focused on needs rather than 
technologies, emphasizing the key trends in society’s changing needs for products and 
services and the contributions that knowledge and research in science and technology in 
particular are likely to make in achieving increased wellbeing. 25 
Early efforts using this type of foresight approach were carried out in the UK in the 
1990s but have now been widely adopted throughout the EU and elsewhere. They have 
proven particularly useful in defining longer-term needs and helping to develop the 
creative linkages from which innovations emerge. The methodology, in summary, 
entails: 
–  a steering group, comprising leaders from the three main constituent 
communities: government, academia and business; 
–  a secretariat to identify the main participants (usually through some variant of a 
co-nomination exercise), to initiate and shape discussions (initial position papers, 
arranging and orchestrating working groups), and to draw together, in conjunction 
with the working groups, individual contributions into an integrated summary; 
–  an organized programme of semi-autonomous working groups, by topic lines 
(which reflect a mix of key needs and strategic technologies) to undertake 
analysis, evaluate evidence and reach conclusions regarding the designed 
timeframe and to produce a summary report on their evidence, findings and 
prognosis; 
–  an integrative effort, usually conducted by chairpersons of the working groups 
and the secretariat to integrate the efforts of the groups into a single entity, and 
develop a strategic level conclusion from the entire effort, usually suggesting 
lines of action and priorities for resource use over a shorter timeframe. 
In parallel with the written papers, one important output is the cohesion that emerges 
from the collaborative process and a broad ownership, although not necessarily 
universal, of the strategic lines and priorities for future action. It provides government, 
academia and business with a template as reference for their efforts in the future. In 
several cases, the exercise has been taken to a lower level of aggregation: converting 
national foresight exercises to the regional level, for example. Exercises are repeated, 
and analyses and conclusions updated using the same procedures, although reduced at 
times in scale and scope, for example, to three to five year cycles to ensure that they 
remain relevant and take into account both intervening scientific progress and changes 
in the needs of society. 
Promotion and dissemination efforts are then initiated to ensure widespread awareness 
of the findings and conclusions of the reports, adding to the shared vision of goals and 
reducing information asymmetries across target audiences. This also enables the 
findings to be incorporated into public policy and budgetary cycles and into strategic 
decisionmaking in the enterprise sector. Academic bodies have also used the reports in 
determining the allocations and priorities for selective efforts in research and teaching. 
With the foresight reports as a guide, the steering group could use their prestige and 
influence with the concerned independent executive agencies to direct resources to fund 
programmes that are recognized in the findings of the reports. Next, monitoring and 
evaluation would follow, along the cyclical lines described earlier. 
One of the consequences of the foresight process is the articulation of poorly structured 




Foresight processes in Canada and the Netherlands 
Technology road maps (TRM) for industry R&D: Technology road mapping is a planning process 
driven by the projected needs of tomorrow’s markets. It helps companies to identify, select, and 
develop technology alternatives to satisfy future service, product or operational needs. Via the TRM 
process, companies in a given sector can pool their resources and work together with academia 
and governments to look five to ten years into the future and determine what their specific market 
will require. The TRM process is led by industry and facilitated by Industry Canada. 
Strategic Project Grants Programme of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada (NSERC): The Strategic Project Grants Programme funds project research in target areas 
of national importance and emerging areas that are of potential significance to Canada. The 
research is at an early stage with the potential to lead to breakthrough discoveries. Targeted areas 
are identified in consultation with experts from all sectors. 
Identifying opportunity for leapfrogging: This is a new body created by NSERC to provide advice on 
the key areas where Canada may have an opportunity to leapfrog into the front ranks of research in 
the natural sciences and engineering. The NSERC Circle comprises all the recent winners of 
NSERC E.W.R. Steacie Memorial Fellowships and the Gerhard Herzberg Canada Gold Medal for 
Science and Engineering. 
In the Netherlands foresight processes are conducted by a number of advisory bodies. The Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Science engages in foresight processes from the perspective of 
promising scientific developments. Several other bodies conduct or are involved in the foresight 
processes from the perspective of knowledge demand. For instance, the Sector Councils, which 
cover a broad array of societal sectors, draw up research agendas formulated on the basis of 
inputs from government, science and the sector involved. A recent example of a priority-setting 
mechanism with a direct follow-up in investment funding is the ICES-KIS programme which 
involves extensive consultation with various stakeholders. 
Source: OCED (2003). 
 
aging population emerged as the unexpected outcome of the first foresight process in 
UK. A nationwide foresight process in India can start with a focus on the country’s 
thematic challenges, such as access to clean water or road congestion.  
Let us now come back to the agents of change—search networks of champions. These 
networks are consolidated through the deliberative evaluation of projects and 
programmes, the ‘next step’ discussion that takes into account the lessons emerging 
from the implementation of projects and relevant international best-practices. To 
illustrate this principle, we use the example of a leading multinational: Nokia. Many of 
its labs (called lablets, a name borrowed from Intel which pioneered them) are 
intentionally co-located at major research universities. Their success is judged by the 
impact they produce in attracting young talent, graduate students. But that cannot be the 
only criterion for evaluation: it is possible that talent is being attracted because instead 
of the opportunity of conducting potentially interesting research for private sector in 
general and for Nokia in particular, the attraction may be the selection of topics. Indeed, 
if such applied research is conducted, there needs to be a discussion on how it could be 27 
relevant for Nokia, and how to attract relevant graduates to Nokia. What is usually 
expected from a formal evaluation is dialogue, not a set of figures: a mini-innovation 
foresight on its own.  
For each strategic pilot (including innovation foresight itself), a similar deliberative 
evaluation needs to be set up. Many uncoordinated and isolated programmes could be 
aligned through such a deliberative evaluation, as it allows transforming piecemeal 
actions into coordinated strategy. Ideally, there should be a body to pool information 
and lessons from specific pilots and projects from different domains of innovation. Such 
a new function could become the single most important responsibility of the re-designed 
National Knowledge Commission (NKC) but of course the NKC is not the only 
candidate for this function; another candidate could be an agency to coordinate national 
innovation foresight (see Box 7). 
6  ‘Double transformation’: summary of the main principles 
The analysis of policymaking and policy implementation is an emerging branch of 
literature on innovation. Usually policy prescriptions follow as an afterthought of 
positive analysis, with the assumption that there is little that can be said about 
implementation of policies. This paper attempted to consider the ‘how to’ issues of 
reform of the India innovation system. Because of the focus on political economy, it is 
written in a different style compared to the rest of the report. Analysis in this paper is 
more controversial and, by necessity, is based less on statistical data than on 
observations of institutional evolution. Benchmarks from countries as diverse as 
Scotland, Finland, Mexico, and Chile were discussed and the emphasis was on the best 
practices of emerging economies as being more relevant for India’s institutional 
environment.  
Here is a summary of the main principles underpinning our analysis and 
recommendations.   
6.1  Reliance on diversity within existing institutions as the ‘Archimedean point’ 
with which to leverage reform and change 
India’s public sector record in coordinating innovation efforts can be notoriously 
fragmented and inefficient, but some sections perform better than others, and there are 
recognized pockets of excellence virtually within every ministry or public sector 
organization. The same internal diversity is even more visible in the private sector. 
Importantly from a policy perspective, better performing segments of the public sector 
and of the productive sector are beginning to join forces in a variety of private-public 
partnerships and programmes in a coordinated effort to overcome the binding 
constraints and to develop new projects.  
6.2  Reliance on search networks linking better performing segments 
of the economy 
Search networks are networks of individuals and institutions solving complex problems 
by finding individuals who already are working on the solution to (part of) the 
problems. The proposed strategic pilots show how to institutionalize emerging search 28 
networks to bring together champions from private and public sectors and India’s talent 
abroad. Search networks sustain change and reform by linking better performing 
segments of Indian economy. 
6.3  Aim for ‘double transformation’  
This principle is about the creation of appropriate context for reform. Reform which 
starts from the better performing and more entrepreneurial segments of the economy are 
more likely to succeed. The demonstration effect of growth makes the diffusion of 
reform to other segments of the economy easier. It also neutralizes the resistance of 
vested interests. Growth is more likely to provide space for self-reinvention at least 
among some segments of the entrenched interests and to define their position in a new 
reform scenario. China is the paragon of double transformation, but in India, too, a 
strategy of ad hoc incrementalism relied on this policy principle in substantial ways.  
A new impetus for change in the Indian context could be achieved by focusing reform 
efforts on the major challenges the country faces, such unique transportation, clean 
water, energy solutions, etc.    
6.4  Reliance on top-down measures to free up policy space  
Programmes, policies and projects cannot be multiplied ad infinitum. The introduction 
of new pilots means cutting down on existing programmes. This not only provides 
budget space to trigger piloting and experimentation but, more importantly, provides the 
correct incentives for players to perform. Underperforming projects are scaled down, 
and released resources reallocated to test new approaches.  
A pragmatic agenda for change often implies focusing on bottom-up entry points (the 
immediate policy agenda), scaling them up to ensure coordination and concerted action 
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Sense of urgency 
Source: Compiled by the author. 29 
(the medium-term policy agenda), and then moving on to major reforms (the longer-run 
policy agenda). The art and craft of policymaking is about sequencing the various 
horizons of a policy agenda in a virtuous circle of growth and reforms. A pragmatic 
agenda to get around the many institutional rigidities faced by India is needed in order 
to: (i) create momentum for change by fostering stakeholder awareness in order to 
(ii)  get a consensus on tackling some of the key obstacles at the national level (to 
enhance demand for an institutional change); and then (iii) moving ahead with concrete, 
manageable bottom-up approaches that can serve as demonstration projects to advance 
the larger agenda (Figure 4).  
6.5  Be humble and ambitious at the same time: bootstrapping approach  
Being humble and ambitious at the same time is about bold vision and strategic change 
in the long-run, albeit gradual implementation. It is about bootstrapping—of 
incremental bottom-up changes in which a favourable balance of risks and returns 
encourages the first steps from many diverse entry points. In this process, each move 
increases the chances of initiating the virtuous cycle of institutional reforms and private 
sector development  (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Policymakers considering bootstrapping 
need to be prepared for unexpected coalitions for reform.  
The prevailing view of reform starts from the design of a blueprint for change, a 
blueprint with a known outcome. In the proposed ‘strategic incrementalism’ approach, 
the institutional outcomes are open-ended, and an attempt to draw a blueprint is 
considered a remnant of central planning. To detect problems and errors, policymakers 





CSIR  Council of Scientific Industrial Research (of India) 
IISc  Indian Institute of Science  
IITs  Indian Institutes of Technology  
ITC  information and communications industry  
NMITLI  New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership Initiative 
MNC  multinational national corporations  
NTEs  new technology enterprises  
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